We study the efficiency properties of equilibria in a neighborhood of economies with Pareto optimal (PO) initial endowments, when the number of agents is finitely large. We provide conditions under which, for all the economies in some open neighborhood of the PO reference economy, all the...

We study the efficiency properties of equilibria in a neighborhood of economies with Pareto optimal (PO) initial endowments, when the number of agents is finitely large. We provide conditions under which, for all the economies in some open neighborhood of the PO reference economy, all the...

We establish that, when the number of agents is sufficiently large, but finite, there are open sets of economies with constrained Pareto inefficient equilibria, and provide a simple sufficient condition for CP inefficiency. We also show that there are open sets of economies with CPO equilibria.

We establish that, when the number of agents is sufficiently large, but finite, there are open sets of economies with constrained Pareto inefficient equilibria, and provide a simple sufficient condition for CP inefficiency. We also show that there are open sets of economies with CPO equilibria.