EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • A-Z
  • Beta
  • About EconBiz
  • News
  • Thesaurus (STW)
  • Academic Skills
  • Help
  •  My account 
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • Login
EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
Publications Events
Search options
Advanced Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites Loans Reservations Fines
    You are here:
  • Home
  • Search: subject:"continuous-time principal-agent models"
Narrow search

Narrow search

Year of publication
Subject
All
continuous-time principal-agent models 4 Bayesian learning 3 Dynamic moral hazard 3 Poisson process 3 bandit models 3 experimentation 3 optimal incentive scheme 3 Agency theory 2 Anreiz 2 Game theory 2 Incentives 2 Learning process 2 Leistungsanreiz 2 Lernprozess 2 Moral Hazard 2 Moral hazard 2 Performance incentive 2 Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie 2 Spieltheorie 2 Stochastic process 2 Stochastischer Prozess 2 optimal concave contract 1 pay-performance sensitivity 1 stochastic optimal effort 1
more ... less ...
Online availability
All
Free 2 Undetermined 2
Type of publication
All
Article 4
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Article in journal 2 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 2 Article 1
Language
All
English 3 Undetermined 1
Author
All
Klein, Nicolas Alexandre 2 Ju, Nengjiu 1 Klein, Nicolas 1 Wan, Xuhu 1
Published in...
All
Management Science 1 Theoretical Economics 1 Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory 1 Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society 1
Source
All
ECONIS (ZBW) 2 EconStor 1 RePEc 1
Showing 1 - 4 of 4
Cover Image
The importance of being honest
Klein, Nicolas - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 3, pp. 773-811
This paper analyzes the case of a principal who wants to provide an agent with proper incentives to explore a hypothesis that can be either true or false. The agent can shirk, thus never proving the hypothesis, or he can avail himself of a known technology to produce fake successes. This latter...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599585
Saved in:
Cover Image
The importance of being honest
Klein, Nicolas Alexandre - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 773-811
This paper analyzes the case of a principal who wants to provide an agent with proper incentives to explore a hypothesis that can be either true or false. The agent can shirk, thus never proving the hypothesis, or he can avail himself of a known technology to produce fake successes. This latter...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671897
Saved in:
Cover Image
The importance of being honest
Klein, Nicolas Alexandre - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 773-811
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584180
Saved in:
Cover Image
Optimal Compensation and Pay-Performance Sensitivity in a Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Model
Ju, Nengjiu; Wan, Xuhu - In: Management Science 58 (2012) 3, pp. 641-657
This paper studies the optimal contract between risk-neutral shareholders and a constant relative risk-aversion manager in a continuous-time model. Several interesting results are obtained. First, the optimal compensation is increasing but concave in output value if the manager is more risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990421
Saved in:
A service of the
zbw
  • Sitemap
  • Plain language
  • Accessibility
  • Contact us
  • Imprint
  • Privacy

Loading...