Search Results - subject:"contract enforceability"

Political connections and informal financing : use of trade credit in China

Cai, Jing; Xu, Nan; Feng, Yuan; Gao, Nan - In: China journal of accounting studies 10 (2022) 1, pp. 26-48

analysis suggests that the lower credit reputation of politically connected firms stems from suppliers’ concern about contract … enforceability, that is, politically connected firms receive regulatory favours from government, which can create obstacles to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013413099

Horizontal Agreements and R&D Complementarities: Merger versus RJV

Ferrett, Ben; Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna - Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA) - 2012

Cournot. Greater brand similarity and contract enforceability ("quality") both favour RJV, while greater R&D complementarity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010548293

Horizontal Agreements and R&D Complementarities: Merger versus RJV

Ferrett, Ben; Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna - School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University - 2012

market, where competition is Cournot. Greater brand similarity and contract enforceability (“quality”) both favour RJV, while …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010553350

Limited Insurance Within the Household: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya

Robinson, Jonathan - Economics Department, University of California-Santa … - 2008

to incomplete contract enforceability) in explaining intra- household risk sharing arrangements in Kenya. The experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011130566

Institutions and Multinational Ownership Strategy

Assche, Ari Van; Schwartz, Galina A. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2008

institutional features on the optimal IJV ownership structure: contract enforceability and cronyism. We introduce the IJV model into …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100800

General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy

Malcomson, James M.; Maw, James W.; McCormick, Barry - 2002

Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however, prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers then receive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315351