Search Results - subject:"cooperation structure"

Games With General Coalitional Structure

Talman, Dolf; Selcuk, O. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2013

Abstract: This paper introduces a new solution concept for cooperative games with general coalitional structure in which only certain sets of players, including the set of all players, are able to form feasible coalitions. The solution concept takes into account the marginal contribution of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092822

Tree, Web and Average Web Value for Cycle-Free Directed Graph Games

Talman, Dolf; Khmelnitskaya, A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2011

On the class of cycle-free directed graph games with transferable utility solution concepts, called web values, are introduced axiomatically, each one with respect to some specific choice of a management team of the graph. We provide their explicit formula representation and simple recursive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091203

Tree-Type Values for Cycle-Free Directed Graph Games

Talman, Dolf; Khmelnitskaya, A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2010

Mathematics Subject Classification 2000: 91A12, 91A43

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091131

On the stability of cooperation structures

Haeringer, Guillaume - 2002

-cooperatively with whom they want to form a link, and the payoffs are given by the Myerson value of the cooperation structure obtained …. We characterize the class of TU-games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, which turns out to be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335692

On the stability of cooperation structures

Haeringer, Guillaume - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011596618

On the Stability of Cooperation Structures

Haeringer, Guillaume - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2000

Qin [J. Eco. Th., 1996] recently showed that in a game of endogenous formation of cooperation structure, if the … underlying TU-game is superadditive, then the full cooperation structure is stable. In this note, we characterize the class of … games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, and show that this class is much larger than that of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572166