EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • A-Z
  • Beta
  • About EconBiz
  • News
  • Thesaurus (STW)
  • Academic Skills
  • Help
  •  My account 
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • Login
EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
Publications Events
Search options
Advanced Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites Loans Reservations Fines
    You are here:
  • Home
  • Search: subject:"corporate criminality"
Narrow search

Narrow search

Year of publication
Subject
All
corporate criminality 4 deterrence 4 monetary penalties versus detection 4 state dependent risk aversion 4 Criminal teams 3 criminal teams 1
Online availability
All
Free 4
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 3 Article 1
Language
All
Undetermined 3 English 1
Author
All
LANGLAIS, Eric 2 Langlais, Eric 2
Institution
All
Centre Européen de Recherche en Économie Financière et en Gestion des Entreprises (CEREFIGE), Unité de Formation et de Recherche Droit, Sciences Économiques et Gestion 1 EconomiX, Université Paris Ouest-Nanterre la Défense (Paris X) 1 Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 1
Published in...
All
Cahiers du CEREFIGE 1 EconomiX Working Papers 1 Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 1 MPRA Paper 1
Source
All
RePEc 4
Showing 1 - 4 of 4
Cover Image
DETERRENCE OF A CRIMINAL TEAM: HOW TO RELY ON ITS MEMBERS' SHORT COMINGS ?
LANGLAIS, Eric - In: Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 4 (2009) 1(7)_ Spring 2009
In this paper, we assume that a criminal organization is an agency where the Principal and the Agent have different sensibilities towards the risk of arrestation and punishment, and at the same time have different skills with respect to general organization tasks, crime realization or detection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004999738
Saved in:
Cover Image
Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’shortcomings ?
LANGLAIS, Eric - EconomiX, Université Paris Ouest-Nanterre la Défense … - 2009
In this paper, we assume that a criminal organization is an agency where the Principal and the Agent have different sensibilities towards the risk of arrestation and punishment, and at the same time have different skills with respect to general organization tasks, crime realization or detection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005635085
Saved in:
Cover Image
Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’ shortcomings?
Langlais, Eric - Centre Européen de Recherche en Économie Financière … - 2009
In this paper, we modelize a criminal organization as an agency where the Principal and the Agent have different sensibilities towards the risk of arrestation and punishment, and at the same time have different skills with respect to general organization tasks, crime realization or detection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779319
Saved in:
Cover Image
Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members' shortcomings?
Langlais, Eric - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
In this paper, we modelize a criminal organization as an agency where the Principal and the Agent have different sensibilities towards the risk of arrestation and punishment, and at the same time have different skills with respect to general organization tasks, crime realization or detection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835537
Saved in:
A service of the
zbw
  • Sitemap
  • Plain language
  • Accessibility
  • Contact us
  • Imprint
  • Privacy

Loading...