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  • Search: subject:"credible deviation"
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Year of publication
Subject
All
ACDC 7 cheap talk 5 credible deviation 5 experiment 5 neologism proofness 5 announcement proofness 4 Asymmetrische Information 3 Experiment 3 Nichtkooperatives Spiel 3 Asymmetric information 2 Cheap talk 2 Credible deviation 2 Dynamisches Spiel 2 Game theory 2 Neologism proofness 2 Noncooperative game 2 Refinement 2 Spieltheorie 2 Communication 1 Dynamic game 1 Kommunikation 1 Theorie 1 refinement 1
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Online availability
All
Free 7
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 7
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 4 Arbeitspapier 2 Graue Literatur 2 Non-commercial literature 2
Language
All
English 4 Undetermined 3
Author
All
Offerman, Theo 7 Onderstal, Sander 7 Ruiz, Adrian de Groot 3 Groot Ruiz, Adrian de 2 de Groot Ruiz, Adrian 2
Institution
All
Tinbergen Instituut 2 Tinbergen Institute 1
Published in...
All
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 3 Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute 2 Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2
Source
All
RePEc 3 ECONIS (ZBW) 2 EconStor 2
Showing 1 - 7 of 7
Cover Image
Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2015
. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491401
Saved in:
Cover Image
Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2015
. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257267
Saved in:
Cover Image
Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2015
. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477113
Saved in:
Cover Image
Equilibrium selection in cheap talk games : ACDC rocks when other criteria remain silent
Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2012
. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383193
Saved in:
Cover Image
Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011
. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325937
Saved in:
Cover Image
Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256700
Saved in:
Cover Image
Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838631
Saved in:
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