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  • Search: subject:"damage allocation"
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Year of publication
Subject
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relative responsibility 4 Cartel 2 Game theory 2 Kartell 2 Shapley value 2 Shapley-Shubik index 2 Spieltheorie 2 cartel damage allocation 2 cartel damages 2 damage allocation 2 joint liability 2 rule of contribution 2 simple voting games 2 Abstimmungsregel 1 Allocation 1 Allokation 1 Antitrust law 1 Haftung 1 Kartellrecht 1 Liability 1 Restraints of competition 1 Shapley-Wert 1 Voting rule 1 Wettbewerbsbeschränkung 1
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Online availability
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Free 4 CC license 1
Type of publication
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Article 2 Book / Working Paper 2
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 2 Arbeitspapier 1 Article 1 Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
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Language
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English 4
Author
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Napel, Stefan 4 Welter, Dominik 4
Published in...
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Games 2 BGPE Discussion Paper 1 BGPE discussion paper : Bavarian graduate program in economics 1
Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 2 EconStor 2
Showing 1 - 4 of 4
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Simple voting games and cartel damage proportioning
Napel, Stefan; Welter, Dominik - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-18
Individual contributions by infringing firms to the compensation of cartel victims must reflect their 'relative responsibility for the harm caused' according to EU legislation. Several studies have argued that the theoretically best way to operationalize this norm is to apply the Shapley value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200136
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Cover Image
Simple voting games and cartel damage proportioning
Napel, Stefan; Welter, Dominik - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-18
Individual contributions by infringing firms to the compensation of cartel victims must reflect their “relative responsibility for the harm caused” according to EU legislation. Several studies have argued that the theoretically best way to operationalize this norm is to apply the Shapley...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012649687
Saved in:
Cover Image
Responsibility-based allocation of cartel damages
Napel, Stefan; Welter, Dominik - 2017
Anti-trust infringers are liable jointly and severally, i.e., any offender may be sued and forced to compensate a victim on behalf of all. EU law then grants the singled-out firm a right to internal redress: all infringers are obliged to contribute in proportion to their relative responsibility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011869120
Saved in:
Cover Image
Responsibility-based allocation of cartel damages
Napel, Stefan; Welter, Dominik - 2017
Anti-trust infringers are liable jointly and severally, i.e., any offender may be sued and forced to compensate a victim on behalf of all. EU law then grants the singled-out firm a right to internal redress: all infringers are obliged to contribute in proportion to their relative responsibility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011698019
Saved in:
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