We consider a many-to-one matching market with externalities among firms where each firm’s preferences satisfy substitutability, increasing choice and no external effect by unchosen workers, which are defined by  Bando (2012). We first illustrate that a sequential version of the deferred...

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...

Kojima and Manea (Econometrica 78(2):633–653, <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">2010</CitationRef>) present two characterizations of when an allocation rule corresponds to the agent-proposing deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm for some substitutable priority rule of the objects being assigned. Building on their results we characterize when...</citationref>

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...

Roth is the major force in creating a vibrant field of matching theory and its application to market design. In doing so, he has discovered many properties of the stable matching problem (especially from the strategic viewpoint of game theory), studied real-life cases to test the relevance of...