A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1, $2, .., $n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state i.e. who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents' prefer- ences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that the...

We show that bounds like those of Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (J. Econ. Theory, 2000) as well as of Gradwohl et al. (Math. Oper. Res., 2009) on the number of alpha-pivotal agents can be obtained by decomposition of variance. All these bounds have a similar asymptotic behaviour, up to constant...

We show that bounds like those of Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (J. Econ. Theory, 2000) as well as of Gradwohl et al. (Math. Oper. Res., 2009) on the number of alpha-pivotal agents can be obtained by decomposition of variance. All these bounds have a similar asymptotic behaviour, up to constant...

Рассматривается игровая задача активной экспертизы, в которой множество возможных результатов является многомерным, строго выпуклым и компактным. Для...

In multiple principal, multiple agent models of moral hazard, we provide conditions under which the outcomes of equilibria in direct mechanisms are preserved when principals can offer indirect communication schemes. We discuss the role of random allocations and recommendations and relate the...