We consider rent-seeking contests between and within two equal-sized groups. Each group adopts one of three sequences: first internal then external contest, first external then internal contest, and simultaneous internal and external contests. Groups cannot unilaterally postpone a contest...

We consider rent-seeking contests between and within two equal-sized groups. Each group adopts one of three sequences: first internal then external contest, first external then internal contest, and simultaneous internal and external contests. Groups cannot unilaterally postpone a contest...

While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based on the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise such as considered by Hirshleifer (1989) may be equally plausible depending on the application. In this paper, we examine the equilibrium set of the n-player difference-form...

While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based on the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise such as considered by Hirshleifer (1989) may be equally plausible depending on the application. In this paper, we examine the equilibrium set of the n-player difference-form...