This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated...

This paper analyzes the implementation of correlated equilibria that are immune to joint deviations of coalitions by cheap-talk protocols. We construct a universal cheap-talk protocol (a polite protocol that uses only 2-player private channels) that is resistant to deviations of fewer than half...

This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result...

Solving large economic models requires large amounts of computational effort, as the complexity of these models increases the computational effort required in their solution increases dramatically. To examine the nature of these solutions researchers need to repeatedly solve models using...

The WALRAS algorithm calculates competitive equilibria via a distributed tatonnement-like process, in which agents submit single-good demand functions to market-clearing auctions. The algorithm is asynchronous and decentralized with respect to both agents and markets, making it suitable for...