We develop a dynamic macroeconomic framework with worker heterogeneity, putty-clay adjustment frictions, and firm monopsony power to study the distributional impact of labor market policies over time. Our framework reconciles the well-known tension between low short-run and high long-run...

Topics of Linear Algebra -- Introduction to Functions of Several Real Variables -- Introduction to Convex Analysis -- Static Optimization -- Linear Programming -- Continuous Dynamical Systems -- Discrete Dynamical Systems -- Introduction to Dynamic Optimization.

Dynamic optimization problems often involve continuous state variables. Casting such problems into dynamic discrete choice models usually requires variable discretization. When there are multiple state variables, many discretized future states will be visited with only very small probability...

We study the feasibility and profitability of predation in a parsimonious infinite-horizon, complete information setting where an incumbent may face an entrant, in which case it needs to decide whether to accommodate or predate it. If the entrant exits, a new entrant is born with positive...

Will an industry with no antitrust policy converge to monopoly, competition, or somewhere in between? We analyze this question using a dynamic dominant firm model with rational agents, endogenous mergers, and constant returns to scale production. We find that perfect competition and monopoly are...

I study a dynamic model of consumer privacy and platform data collection. In each period, consumers choose their level of platform activity. Greater activity generates more information about the consumer, thereby increasing platform profits. When the platform can commit to the future privacy...

A survey is provided dealing with the formulation of modelling problems for dynamic factor models, and the various algorithm possibilities for solving these modelling problems. Emphasis is placed on understanding requirements for the handling of errors, noting the relevance of the proposed...

This paper proposes a model of intertemporal preferences where the relative risk aversion depends on the time horizon of the agent. The agent is supposed to evaluate risk in the short run with a relative risk aversion coefficient which differs from its long run value. As preferences are no more...