show that the Equal Division Solution belongs to the core and we provide a sufficient condition under which such games are …

the equal division solution) to the so-called delta-reducing player property, stating that a delta-reducing player (being …

the Banzhaf value satisfy both. The equal division solution does satisfy both axioms and, moreover, together with symmetry … these axioms characterize the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency …Three well-known solutions for cooperative TU-games are the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value and the equal division …

the Banzhaf value satisfy both. The equal division solution does satisfy both axioms and, moreover, together with symmetry … these axioms characterize the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency …Three well-known solutions for cooperative TU-games are the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value and the equal division …

and are shown to coincide with the Shapley value and the equal division solution of the associated TU-game introduced by …

-known solutions for cooperative TU-games are the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value and the equal division solution. In the literature … both. The equal division solution does satisfy both axioms and, moreover, together with symmetry these axioms characterize … the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality …

the Banzhaf value satisfy both. The equal division solution does satisfy both axioms and, moreover, together with symmetry … these axioms characterize the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency …Three well-known solutions for cooperative TU-games are the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value and the equal division …

cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division … types of results on egalitarian Shapley values being convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division … solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it possible to study this trade-off in a consistent way by providing three …

cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division … types of results on egalitarian Shapley values being convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division … solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it possible to study this trade-off in a consistent way by providing three …

cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division … types of results on egalitarian Shapley values being convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division … solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it possible to study this trade-off in a consistent way by providing three …