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  • Search: subject:"equilibrium allocations"
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common agency 2 menus 2 mixed-strategy equilibrium 2 robust equilibrium allocations 2 take it or leave it offers 2 AD type with government activity. Wages and aggregate employment levels are set according to an efficient (Nash) bargaining agreement while the commodity market is cleared in a competitive way. It is shown that, for each level of union power, measured by the share it obtains of the total production surplus, efficient bargaining implies no efficiency loss in production. Depending on the level of union power, temporary equilibria may exhibit voluntary overemployment or underemployment with the competitive equilibrium being a special case. Due to the price feedback from the commodity market and to income-induced demand effects, all temporary equilibria with a positive labor share are not Nash bargaining-efficient with respect to the set of feasible temporary equilibrium allocations. While higher union power induces a larger share of the surplus and a higher real wage, it always implies lower output and employment. Moreover, the induced nominal equilibrium wage is not always a monotonically increasing function of union power. Therefore, all temporary equilibria with efficient bargaining are only Second-best Pareto optimal, i.\,e.\ bargaining power and production efficiency do not lead to temporary optimality. The dynamic evolution of money balances, prices, and wages is analyzed being driven primarily by government budget deficits and expectations by consumers. It is shown that for each fixed level of union power, the features of the dynamics under perfect foresight are structurally identical to those of the same economy under competitive wage and price setting. These are: stationary equilibria with perfect foresight do not exist, except on a set of parameters of measure zero 1 Beschäftigung 1 Dynamisches Modell 1 Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft 1 Lohnverhandlungen 1 Makroökonomik 1 Pareto optimality 1 Spieltheorie 1 Theorie 1 Verhandlungsmacht 1 Wirtschaftliche Effizienz 1 axiomatic approach 1 balanced paths of monetary expansion or contraction are the only possibilities inducing constant allocations 1 dynamic equilibrium allocations 1 equilibrium allocations 1 for small levels of government demand, there exist two balanced paths generically, one of which with high employment and production is always unstable, while the other one may be stable or unstable. 1 homogenous utility functions 1 nonconvexities 1 technological externalities 1
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Free 5
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Book / Working Paper 5
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 1
Language
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English 4 Undetermined 1
Author
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Han, Seungjin 2 Böhm, Volker 1 Claas, Oliver 1 Marini, Giancarlo 1 Polterovich, Victor 1 Senesi, Pietro 1
Institution
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Centro di Studi Internazionali Sull'Economia e la Sviluppo (CEIS), Facoltà di Economia 1 Department of Economics, McMaster University 1 Vancouver School of Economics 1 Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 1
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CEIS Research Paper 1 Department of Economics Working Papers / Department of Economics, McMaster University 1 MPRA Paper 1 Microeconomics.ca working papers 1 Working Papers 1
Source
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RePEc 4 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 5 of 5
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Efficient wage bargaining in a dynamic macroeconomic model
Böhm, Volker; Claas, Oliver - 2012
This paper analyzes the implications of bilateral bargaining over wages and employment between a producer and a union representing a finite number of identical workers in a monetary macroeconomic model of the AS
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319989
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On Take It or Leave It Offers in Common Agency
Han, Seungjin - Vancouver School of Economics - 2011
information, the set of all equilibrium allocations in the menu game where menus of contracts are allowed coincides with the set … of all equilibrium allocations in the single contract game where only single contracts are allowed. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009191052
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On Take It or Leave It Offers in Common Agency
Han, Seungjin - Department of Economics, McMaster University - 2010
information, the set of all equilibrium allocations in the menu game where menus of contracts are allowed coincides with the set … of all equilibrium allocations in the single contract game where only single contracts are allowed. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008461042
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Multiplicity of Dynamic Equilibria and Global Efficiency
Marini, Giancarlo; Senesi, Pietro - Centro di Studi Internazionali Sull'Economia e la … - 2004
Within a one-sector, infinite-horizon representative agent model with technological externalities and a convex-concave production function, this paper derives a capital subsidy policy that simultaneously eliminates the wedge between private and social marginal products of capital, and achieves a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005695018
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Экономическое равновесие и оптимум
Polterovich, Victor - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 1973
allocation , and prove that only equilibrium allocations can meet all the requirements. In fact, it takes place under very …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532166
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