In dynamic environments, Q-learning is an adaptative rule that provides an estimate (a Q-value) of the continuation value associated with each alternative. A naive policy consists in always choosing the alternative with highest Q-value. We consider a family of Q-based policy rules that may...

Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly equilibria are usually explained by strategic interactions, e.g., the best-replies. However, the best-replies often do not converge, require unrealistic information, suffer inconsistency, and exclude small firms. Alternatively, every firm may choose its output or...

This paper proposes a model of equilibrium switching in coordination games such as collective participation in social changes. In our model, players are forward-looking but use level-k reasoning about their peers' choices. We find that equilibrium switching is deterministic and gradual, with...

This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of finite-player games, the limit of any convergent sequence of Nash equilibria of the...

In the game of rock-paper-scissors with three players, this paper identifies conditions for a correlated equilibrium that differs from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and is evolutionarily stable. For this to occur, the correlation device attaches more probability to three-way ties and...

Market power in water markets can be modeled as simultaneous quantity competition on a river structure and analyzed by applying social equilibrium. In an example of a duopoly water market, we argue that the lack of backward induction logic implies that the upstream supplier foregoes profitable...