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  • Search: subject:"evolving default"
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Year of publication
Subject
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evolving default 13 stable set 10 committee voting 7 bargaining 6 Bargaining 4 Verhandlungstheorie 4 Abstimmungsregel 3 Bargaining theory 3 Game theory 3 Legislative bargaining 3 Negotiations 3 Spieltheorie 3 Verhandlungen 3 Voting rule 3 distributive politics 3 proposal power 3 reconsideration 3 lack of commitment 2 public goods 2 spatial model 2
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Online availability
All
Free 12
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 9 Article 4
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 4 Article in journal 2 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 2 Arbeitspapier 1 Article 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
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Language
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English 8 Undetermined 5
Author
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Anesi, Vincent 10 Seidmann, Daniel J. 9 Fong, Pohan 3 Diermeier, Daniel 1 Seidmann, Daniel J 1
Institution
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Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), School of Economics 3 Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management 2
Published in...
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Discussion Papers / Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), School of Economics 3 CeDEx Discussion Paper Series 2 Discussion Papers / Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management 2 Theoretical Economics 2 CEDEX discussion paper series 1 Discussion Paper 1 Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory 1 Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society 1
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Source
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RePEc 6 EconStor 4 ECONIS (ZBW) 3
Showing 1 - 10 of 13
Cover Image
Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. Our main goal is to study the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599519
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Cover Image
Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. Our main goal is to study the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773115
Saved in:
Cover Image
Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. Our main goal is to study the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674462
Saved in:
Cover Image
Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012
contemporaneous perfect E-equilibria of a related model of repeated implementation with an evolving default; and that immovable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392405
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Cover Image
Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2012
contemporaneous perfect e-equilibria of a related model of repeated implementation with an evolving default; and that immovable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010568440
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Cover Image
Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012
contemporaneous perfect E-equilibria of a related model of repeated implementation with an evolving default; and that immovable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535532
Saved in:
Cover Image
Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2011
contemporaneous perfect e-equilibria of a related model of repeated implementation with an evolving default; and that stable decisions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392414
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Cover Image
Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2011
contemporaneous perfect ?-equilibria of a related model of repeated implementation with an evolving default; and that stable decisions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010545656
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Cover Image
Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2011
contemporaneous perfect ?-equilibria of a related model of repeated implementation with an evolving default; and that stable decisions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010611965
Saved in:
Cover Image
Existence and computation of pure-strategy equilibria in models of legislative bargaining with reconsideration
Diermeier, Daniel; Fong, Pohan - 2008
Diermeier and Fong (2008a) recently proposed a legislative bargaining model with reconsideration in the context of a distributive policy environment. In this paper we prove general existence and necessary conditions for pure-strategy stationary equilibria for any finite policy space and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266325
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