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  • Search: subject:"ex post incentive compatibility"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Mechanism design 11 ex post incentive compatibility 11 interdependent values 9 Auction theory 6 Auktionstheorie 6 ex-post incentive compatibility 5 Anreiz 4 Asymmetric information 4 Asymmetrische Information 4 Auctions 4 Incentives 4 Mechanismus-Design-Theorie 4 rationalizability 4 robust implementation 4 virtual implementation 4 Ex post incentive compatibility 3 Game theory 3 Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem 3 Repeated trade 3 Robust implementation 3 Spieltheorie 3 Virtual implementation 3 asymptotic efficiency 3 budget balance 3 dynamic mechanism design 3 incentive compatibility 3 mechanism design 3 multi-dimensional information 3 multi-unit demand and supply 3 private information 3 repeated games 3 Double auction 2 Economics of information 2 Ex-post incentive compatibility 2 Informationsökonomik 2 Neue politische Ökonomie 2 Public choice 2 Rationalizability 2 robust measurability 2 robust mechanism design 2
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Online availability
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Free 23
Type of publication
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Article 15 Book / Working Paper 8
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Article 5 Article in journal 5 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 5 Working Paper 4 Arbeitspapier 3 Graue Literatur 3 Non-commercial literature 3
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Language
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English 22 Undetermined 1
Author
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Bergemann, Dirk 6 Morris, Stephen 6 Athey, Susan 3 Bikhchandani, Sushil 3 Kojima, Fuhito 3 Miller, David A. 3 Postlewaite, Andrew 3 Yamashita, Takuro 3 Kunimoto, Takashi 2 McLean, Richard 2 Barberà, Salvador 1 Berga Colom, Dolors 1 Dirk Bergemann 1 Han, Seungjin 1 MacLean, Richard P. 1 Moreno, Bernardo 1 Serrano, Robert 1 Serrano, Roberto 1 Stephen Morris 1
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Institution
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Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 3 Brown University, Department of Economics 1 Department of Economics, Princeton University 1 Department of Economics, Yale University 1
Published in...
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Theoretical Economics 9 Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory 5 Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 3 Barcelona GSE working paper series : working paper 1 Department of Economics working paper series / McMaster University, Department of Economics 1 Working Paper 1 Working Papers / Brown University, Department of Economics 1 Working papers / TSE : WP 1
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Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 8 RePEc 8 EconStor 6 BASE 1
Showing 1 - 10 of 23
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Quasi ex-post equilibrium in competing mechanisms
Han, Seungjin - 2020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012248990
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The role of domain restrictions in mechanism design : ex post incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency
Barberà, Salvador; Berga Colom, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872382
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Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency
Kojima, Fuhito; Yamashita, Takuro - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1393-1438
supply. We propose a new mechanism that satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010016
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Double auction with interdependent values : incentives and efficiency
Kojima, Fuhito; Yamashita, Takuro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1393-1438
supply. We propose a new mechanism that satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744298
Saved in:
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Double auction with interdependent values : incentives and efficiency
Kojima, Fuhito; Yamashita, Takuro - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012217156
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Implementation with interdependent valuations
Postlewaite, Andrew; McLean, Richard - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599559
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Implementation with interdependent valuations
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132
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Implementation with interdependent valuations
Postlewaite, Andrew; McLean, Richard - In: Theoretical Economics (2014)
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010940430
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Evaluating the conditions for robust mechanism design
Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Robert - 2010
three conditions: ex post incentive compatibility, robust monotonicity, and robust measurability. Ex post incentive … that while violations of ex post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity do not easily go away, we identify a mild … compatibility has been shown to be necessary for any concept of robust implementation, while robust monotonicity and robust …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284054
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Evaluating the Conditions for Robust Mechanism Design Abstract: We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus...
Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto - Brown University, Department of Economics - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509886
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