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  • Search: subject:"ex post inefficiency"
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Year of publication
Subject
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ex post inefficiency 3 Agreements to agree 2 bargaining 2 ruling out but not ruling in 2 Agency 1 Agency theory 1 Asymmetric information 1 Asymmetrische Information 1 Budget constraint 1 Budgetrestriktion 1 Ex post inefficiency 1 Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie 1 Soft budget constraint 1 Theorie 1 Theory 1 agency 1 information 1 project screening (and termination) 1
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Online availability
All
Free 4 CC license 1
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 3 Article 1
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1
Language
All
English 2 Undetermined 2
Author
All
Hart, Oliver 2 Moore, John 2 Wang, Yijiang 2 Bai, Chong-En 1 Bai, Chong-en 1
Institution
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London School of Economics (LSE) 1 Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE 1 William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan 1
Published in...
All
Journal of government and economics : JGE 1 LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 1 STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 1 William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 1
Source
All
RePEc 3 ECONIS (ZBW) 1
Showing 1 - 4 of 4
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Optimal mechanism in governmental project screening : a theory of Kornai's soft budget constraint
Bai, Chong-En; Wang, Yijiang - In: Journal of government and economics : JGE 7 (2022), pp. 1-8
Soft budget constraint refers to the phenomenon that money losing inefficient projects keep on getting subsidies and operating. It was first phrased and analyzed by the late Hungarian economist Janos Kornai when he studied former socialist economies and by now, economists generally have agreed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013429228
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Cover Image
AGREEING NOW TO AGREE LATER: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In
Hart, Oliver; Moore, John - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics … - 2004
write a "tight" contract (short list), even though this leads to ex post inefficiency. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005510513
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Cover Image
Agreeing now to agree later: contracts that rule out but do not rule in
Hart, Oliver; Moore, John - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004
write a "tight" contract (short list), even though this leads to ex post inefficiency. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746644
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Cover Image
Agency in Project Screening and Termination Decisions: Why Is Good Money Thrown After Bad?
Bai, Chong-en; Wang, Yijiang - William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan - 1997
We construct an agency model in which the planner (agent) makes project starting and termination decisions on behalf of the state (principal) to reflect the practice of socialist economies. The model shows that asymmetric information between the state and the planner regarding the quality of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489869
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