We study dynamic signaling in a game of stochastic stakes. Each period, a privately informed agent of binary type chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public stakes variable or to irreversibly exit the game. A...

We study dynamic signaling in a game of stochastic stakes. Each period, a privately informed agent of binary type chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public stakes variable or to irreversibly exit the game. A...

This paper establishes that entry and exit regulate the top half of the profitability distribution in the post-1970 U.S. economy. We, first, document stability in the distribution of total profits earned on tangible, intangible, and financial capital. Whereas a narrower measure of returns on...

This paper establishes that entry and exit regulate the top half of the profitability distribution in the post-1970 U.S. economy. We, first, document stability in the distribution of total profits earned on tangible, intangible, and financial capital. Whereas a narrower measure of returns on...

We develop an econometric model for firm exit, using stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) as a starting point. According to SDP, the value of an operating firm can be written as the sum of (i) the net present value of continuing production if the firm is committed to a future exit date, and (ii)...

We develop an econometric model for firm exit, using stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) as a starting point. According to SDP, the value of an operating firm can be written as the sum of (i) the net present value of continuing production if the firm is committed to a future exit date, and (ii)...