We consider the risk premium demanded by a decision maker in order to be indifferent between obtaining a new level of wealth with certainty, or to participate in a lottery which either results in unchanged wealth or an even higher level than what can be obtained with certainty. We study...

We consider the risk premium demanded by a decision maker in order to be indifferent between obtaining a new level of wealth with certainty, or to participate in a lottery which either results in unchanged wealth or an even higher level than what can be obtained with certainty. We study...

This paper proposes a new decision theory of how individuals make random errors when they compute the expected utility of risky lotteries. When distorted by errors, the expected utility of a lottery never exceeds (falls below) the utility of the highest (lowest) outcome. This assumption implies...

Rabin (Econometrica 68(5):1281–1292, <CitationRef CitationID="CR19">2000</CitationRef>) argues that, under expected-utility, observed risk aversion over modest stakes implies extremely high risk aversion over large stakes. Cox and Sadiraj (Games Econom. Behav. 56(1):45–60, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">2006</CitationRef>) have replied that this is a problem of expected-utility...</citationref></citationref>

Robin Pope argues that Kotlikoff is right to favor shifting payroll taxes to sales taxes only Kotlikoff fails to mention all the benefits that would be obtained by the shift. One of these benefits would be aiding employment by shifting the burden of risk bearing from firms to governments that...

The paper proves that the Bayesian approach to learning and expectations formation implies no propositions that could conceivably be refuted by observation. For a (non-expanding) universe infinite in time but finite at any point of time, it is shown that by a suitable choice of priors, any...