The paper proves that the Bayesian approach to learning and expectations formation implies no propositions that could conceivably be refuted by observation. For a (non-expanding) universe infinite in time but finite at any point of time, it is shown that by a suitable choice of priors, any...

There exists no completely satisfactory theory of risk attitude in current normative decision theories. Existing notions confound attitudes to pure risk with unrelated psychological factors such as strength of preference for certain outcomes, and probability weighting. In addition traditional...

In binary choice between discrete outcome lotteries, an individual may prefer lottery L <Subscript>1</Subscript> to lottery L <Subscript>2</Subscript> when the probability that L <Subscript>1</Subscript> delivers a better outcome than L <Subscript>2</Subscript> is higher than the probability that L <Subscript>2</Subscript> delivers a better outcome than L <Subscript>1</Subscript>. Such a preference can be rationalized by three...</subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript>

The conventional parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory do not explain the St. Petersburg paradox. To do so, the power coefficient of an individual's utility function must be lower than the power coefficient of an individual's probability weighting function.

Which issues are discussed by candidates in an election campaign? Why are some issues never discussed? Model tractability is lost quickly when dealing with these questions, partly because of the multidimensional voting inherent in models of multiple issues. Our model features two candidates for...

This paper develops a utility model for evaluating lotteries. In estimating utility, risk averse people use an asymmetric loss function. Expected utility is seen as a special case that is a good approximation in some cases. The model resolves several paradoxes and makes easily falsifiable...