A two-persons bargaining problem often consists of initially incompatible demands that can be unilaterally reduced by sequential concessions. In a 2 x 2 x 2-factorial design we distinguish between reliable and unreliable concessions, between a static and dynamic settings and between symmetric...

This paper aims to experimentally investigate how individual willingness to pay for a lottery is affected by using a new way of representing of probabilistic ambiguity. Thus we can see how individual valuation reacts to different degrees of ambiguity probability information provided to subjects....

Assuming inequality averse subjects as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or in the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) in ultimatum games with asymmetric conflict payoffs allows to make predictions especially concerning responder acceptance thresholds. These predictions are tested in a...

Arguably the most important campaign finance regulations in U.S. federal elections are limitsimposed on the amount that an individual or organization may donate to a federal campaign. Suchcontribution limits are advocated on two separate grounds. The first is that they prevent corruption,the...

Hegemony is a central feature of contemporary international politicsbut it remains seriously under-theorized. We draw on cooperative game theoryto represent and analyze different aspects of hegemony. After developing ageneral conception of hegemony, we analyze the circumstances under which...

Experimental research on decision making under risk has until now always employed choicedata in order to evaluate the empirical performance of expected utility and the alternative nonexpectedutility theories. The present paper performs a similar analysis which relies on pricingdata instead of...

This paper purports to provide experimental evidence explaining a number of stylized facts associated with thebehaviour of financial returns, in particular, the fat tailed nature of their distribution and the persistence in theirvolatility. By means of a laboratory experiment, we will...