EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • A-Z
  • Beta
  • About EconBiz
  • News
  • Thesaurus (STW)
  • Academic Skills
  • Help
  •  My account 
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • Login
EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
Publications Events
Search options
Advanced Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites Loans Reservations Fines
    You are here:
  • Home
  • Search: subject:"feasible coalition"
Narrow search

Narrow search

Year of publication
Subject
All
core 6 feasible coalition 6 Cooperative game 4 TU-game 4 Communication graph 3 Core 3 Feasible coalition 3 Partially ordered set 3 Solution concept 3 hierarchy 3 communication graph 1 cooperative game 1 partially ordered set 1 solution concept 1
more ... less ...
Online availability
All
Free 9
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 9
Language
All
Undetermined 8 English 1
Author
All
Grabisch, Michel 9 Xie, Lijue 5
Institution
All
HAL 7 Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne) 2
Published in...
All
Post-Print / HAL 5 Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2 PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" 1 Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) 1
Source
All
RePEc 9
Showing 1 - 9 of 9
Cover Image
The core of games on ordered structures and graphs
Grabisch, Michel - HAL - 2013
In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In many situations, this assumption is too strong and one has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010784108
Saved in:
Cover Image
The core of games on ordered structures and graphs
Grabisch, Michel - HAL - 2013
In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In many situations, this assumption is too strong and one has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010632947
Saved in:
Cover Image
The core of games on ordered structures and graphs
Grabisch, Michel - HAL - 2013
In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In many situations, this assumption is too strong and one has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635098
Saved in:
Cover Image
The restricted core of games on distributive lattices: how to share benefits in a hierarchy
Grabisch, Michel; Xie, Lijue - HAL - 2011
Finding a solution concept is one of the central problems in cooperative game theory, and the notion of core is the most popular solution concept since it is based on some rationality condition. In many real situations, not all possible coalitions can form, so that classical TU-games cannot be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605308
Saved in:
Cover Image
The core of games on ordered structures and graphs
Grabisch, Michel - HAL - 2009
In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In many situations, this assumption is too strong and one has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738645
Saved in:
Cover Image
The core of games on k-regular set systems
Xie, Lijue; Grabisch, Michel - HAL - 2009
In the classical setting of cooperative game theory, it is always assumed that all coalitions are feasible. However in many real situations, there are restrictions on the set of coalitions, for example duo to communication, order or hierarchy on the set of players, etc. There are already many...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738649
Saved in:
Cover Image
The core of games on k-regular set systems.
Xie, Lijue; Grabisch, Michel - Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 … - 2009
In the classical setting of cooperative game theory, it is always assumed that all coalitions are feasible. However in many real situations, there are restrictions on the set of coalitions, for example duo to communication, order or hierarchy on the set of players, etc. There are already many...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008622031
Saved in:
Cover Image
The core of games on distributive lattices : how to share benefits in a hierarchy
Grabisch, Michel; Xie, Lijue - HAL - 2008
Finding a solution concept is one of the central problems in cooperative game theory, and the notion of core is the most popular solution concept since it is based on some rationality condition. In many real situations, not all possible coalitions can form, so that classical TU-games cannot be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738449
Saved in:
Cover Image
The core of games on distributive lattices : how to share benefits in a hierarchy.
Grabisch, Michel; Xie, Lijue - Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 … - 2008
Finding a solution concept is one of the central problems in cooperative game theory, and the notion of core is the most popular solution concept since it is based on some rationality condition. In many real situations, not all possible coalitions can form, so that classical TU-games cannot be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670861
Saved in:
A service of the
zbw
  • Sitemap
  • Plain language
  • Accessibility
  • Contact us
  • Imprint
  • Privacy

Loading...