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  • Search: subject:"finite belief hierarchy"
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Year of publication
Subject
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finite belief hierarchy 2 Finite belief hierarchy 1 Games of incomplete information 1 Inconsistent beliefs 1 games of incomplete information 1 generalized belief hierarchy 1 generalized type space 1 incomplete information games 1 inconsistent beliefs 1 type space 1 unawareness 1
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Online availability
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Free 2 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 2 Article 1
Language
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Undetermined 2 English 1
Author
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Pintér, Miklós 1 Sakovics, Jozsef 1 Sákovics, József 1 Udvari, Zsolt 1
Institution
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School of Economics, University of Edinburgh 1 Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 1
Published in...
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ESE Discussion Papers 1 MPRA Paper 1 Theory and Decision 1
Source
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RePEc 3
Showing 1 - 3 of 3
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Generalized type spaces
Pintér, Miklós; Udvari, Zsolt - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
cannot handle the notions of finite belief hierarchy and unawareness among others. In this paper we consider a generalization …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325558
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Games of incomplete information without common knowledge priors
Sakovics, Jozsef - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2004
We relax the assumption that priors are common knowledge, in the standard model of games of incomplete information. We make the realistic assumption that the players are boundedly rational: they base their actions on finite-order belief hierarchies. When the different layers of beliefs are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005246004
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Cover Image
Games of Incomplete Information Without Common Knowledge Priors
Sákovics, József - In: Theory and Decision 50 (2001) 4, pp. 347-366
We relax the assumption that priors are common knowledge, in the standard model of games of incomplete information. We make the realistic assumption that the players are boundedly rational: they base their actions on finite-order belief hierarchies. When the different layers of beliefs are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005678320
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