I estimate a simultaneous discrete game with incomplete information where players’ private information are only required to be median independent of observed states and can be correlated with observable states. This median restriction is weaker than other assumptions on players’ private...

This paper studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponent's. We characterize equilibrium paysoffs in termsof simple strategies in which an explanation phase is followed by a...

The Kreps—Wilson—Milgrom—Roberts framework is one of the most renowned ways of modelling reputation—building. Once the number of repetitions of the game is considered as a choice variable, such a framework can fruitfully be employed to study the optimal length of a relationship. We...

A mistake in “Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium (CE) in games with incomplete informationâ€\x9D motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced. Copyright Springer 2006

This article studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponents'. We chararacterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an exploration phase is followed...

The sealed bid k-double auction is a mechanism used to structure bilateral bargaining under two-sided incomplete information. This mechanism is tested in two experiments in which subjects are asked to bargain repeatedly for 50 rounds with the same partner under conditions of information...