Search Results - subject:"hierarchical outcome"

A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games

van den Brink, Rene; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - 2012

the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326336

A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games

Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257390

A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722639

Comparable Characterizations of Four Solutions for Permission Tree Games

van den Brink, René; Dietz, Chris; van der Laan, Gerard; … - 2015

game. For cycle-free connected graphs, Demange (2004) introduced for each player the corresponding hierarchical outcome … games the hierarchical outcome with respect to the root of the tree (top player), along with a new solution that assigns all …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491412

Comparable Characterizations of Four Solutions for Permission Tree Games

Brink, René van den; Dietz, Chris; Laan, Gerard van der; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256471

Comparable characterizations of four solutions for permission tree games

Brink, René van den; Dietz, Chris; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477095

A strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for cycle-free graph games

van den Brink, René; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 6, pp. 2737-2748

the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719008

A strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for cycle-free graph games

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - In: Journal of economic theory 148 (2013) 6, pp. 2737-2748

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257894

Comparable characterizations of four solutions for permission tree games

Brink, René van den; Dietz, Chris; Laan, Gerard van der; … - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 63 (2017) 4, pp. 903-923

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011740076

Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities

van den Brink, Rene; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - 2010

In this paper we consider the problem of sharing water from a river among a group of agents (countries, cities, firms) located along the river. The benefit of each agent depends on the amount of water consumed by the agent. An allocation of the water among the agents is efficient when it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325973