It is often observed that superiors within an organization can lead subordinates because the former are smarter or have more organization-related knowledge. In this paper, we argue that even without such superior talent or prior knowledge, superiors can outperform and lead subordinates....

This thesis analyzes the formation of networks as a result of the search for valuable information by the agents. The contribution of this work is the separation of information in types. Volume or quantity of information matters but also what kind of information. As a result, we have networks in...

We consider a principal-multi agent model that features a three-tier hierarchy, defined as a setting where the principal contracts with an agent-manager and delegates to the manager some authority to contract with other agents. A key highlight is that incentive compensation, performance...

We are on an unsustainable path of consumption and production, including resources turned into waste in a high pace. As one answer to this challenge the European Commission has launched the concept of circular economy as described in “Closing the loop – An EU action plan for the Circular...

In the last two decades, there has been a progressive extension of delegation to European regulatory agencies, which has led to important claims about the agencification of EU executive governance. Yet, there is still little knowledge about how and under what conditions, in practice, agencies...

This paper proposes a new "power theory" of personal income distribution. Contrary to the standard assumption that income is proportional to productivity, I hypothesize that income is most strongly determined by social power, as indicated by one's position within an institutional hierarchy....

According to the theory of capital as power, capitalism, like any other mode of power, is born through sabotage and lives in chains - and yet everywhere we look we see it grow and expand. What explains this apparent puzzle of "growth in the midst of sabotage"? The answer, we argue, begins with...

We analyze a game in which players with unique information are arranged in a hierarchy. In the lowest layer each player can decide in each of several rounds either to pass the information to his successor or to hold. While passing generates an immediate payoff according to the value of...