Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with...

Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with...

In his paper Emotion and reasoning in human decision-making (Economics Discussion Papers, No 2019-8) Edmund Rolls points out that multiple and independent types of reinforcement exist in the human brain, and that they cannot be reduced to a common currency. The present commentary introduces...

In his paper Emotion and reasoning in human decision-making (Economics Discussion Papers, No 2019-8) Edmund Rolls points out that multiple and independent types of reinforcement exist in the human brain, and that they cannot be reduced to a common currency. The present commentary introduces...