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  • Search: subject:"imperfect commitment"
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Year of publication
Subject
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imperfect commitment 14 asymmetric information 7 Asymmetric information 6 Asymmetrische Information 6 mechanism design 5 Imperfect Commitment 4 dynamics 4 Agency theory 3 Auction theory 3 Auktionstheorie 3 Incomplete information 3 Intermediation 3 Mechanism design 3 Mechanismus-Design-Theorie 3 Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie 3 Unvollkommene Information 3 adverse selection 3 auctions 3 bilateral trade 3 communication 3 contract theory 3 signaling 3 Bargaining theory 2 Delegation 2 Game theory 2 Incomplete market 2 Market mechanism 2 Marktmechanismus 2 Mechanism Design 2 Partial Contracting 2 Spieltheorie 2 Transferable Utility 2 Unvollkommener Markt 2 Verhandlungstheorie 2 Vermittlungstätigkeit 2 non-optimality of posting prices 2 optimal mechanism 2 Adverse Selektion 1 Adverse selection 1 Auction 1
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Online availability
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Free 19 CC license 1
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 17 Article 2
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 11 Arbeitspapier 6 Graue Literatur 6 Non-commercial literature 6 Article 1 Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1
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Language
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English 14 Undetermined 5
Author
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Beccuti, Juan I. 4 Bester, Helmut 3 Eilat, Ran 3 Pauzner, Ady 3 Strausz, Roland 3 Jun, Byoung Heon 2 Krähmer, Daniel 2 Wolfstetter, Elmar G. 2 Benatia, David 1 Billette de Villemeur, Étienne 1 Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn 1 Krishna, Vijay 1 Morgan, John 1 Nunes, Ricardo 1 Wolfstetter, Elmar 1 Zylberberg, Yanos 1
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Institution
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Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 2 Abteilung "Marktprozesse und Steuerung", Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) 1 CESifo 1 Development and Policies Research Center (Depocen) 1 Institute of Business and Economic Research (IBER), Walter A. Haas School of Business 1
Published in...
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Discussion Papers 2 Diskussionsschriften / Universität Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaftlehre 2 CESifo Working Paper 1 CESifo Working Paper Series 1 CESifo working papers 1 Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series 1 Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 1 Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance 1 Discussion paper 1 Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 1 MPRA Paper 1 SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 1 Série des documents de travail 1 Theoretical Economics 1 Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory 1 WZB Discussion Paper 1 Working Papers / Development and Policies Research Center (Depocen) 1
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Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 7 EconStor 6 RePEc 6
Showing 1 - 10 of 19
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Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary
Eilat, Ran; Pauzner, Ady - 2023
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014365304
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Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary
Eilat, Ran; Pauzner, Ady - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1655-1714
We study intermediaries who seek to maximize gains from trade in bilateral negotiations. Intermediaries are players: they cannot commit to act against their objective function and deny, in some cases, trade they believe to be beneficial. This impairs their ability to assist the parties relative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189033
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Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary
Eilat, Ran; Pauzner, Ady - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1655-1714
We study intermediaries who seek to maximize gains from trade in bilateral negotiations. Intermediaries are players: they cannot commit to act against their objective function and deny, in some cases, trade they believe to be beneficial. This impairs their ability to assist the parties relative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806593
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Strategic reneging in sequential imperfect markets
Benatia, David; Billette de Villemeur, Étienne - 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012237506
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Auctions with Imperfect Commitment when the Reserve May Serve as a Signal
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2014
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333455
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Optimal selling mechanisms under imperfect commitment: Extending to the multi-period case
Beccuti, Juan I. - 2014
This paper studies the optimal mechanism for a seller (she) that sells, in a sequence of periods, an indivisible object per period to the same buyer (he). Buyer's willingness to pay remains constant along time and is his private information. The seller can commit to the current period mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420619
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Optimal selling mechanisms under imperfect commitment
Beccuti, Juan I. - 2014
This paper studies the optimal mechanisms for a seller with imperfect commitment who puts up for sale one individual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420631
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Auctions with Imperfect Commitment when the Reserve May Serve as a Signal
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - CESifo - 2014
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer’s type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735190
Saved in:
Cover Image
Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may serve as a signal
Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2014
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010231626
Saved in:
Cover Image
Optimal selling mechanisms under imperfect commitment : extending to the multi-period case
Beccuti, Juan I. - 2014
This paper studies the optimal mechanism for a seller (she) that sells, in a sequence of periods, an indivisible object per period to the same buyer (he). Buyer's willingness to pay remains constant along time and is his private information. The seller can commit to the current period mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402241
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