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  • Search: subject:"imperfect private monitoring"
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Year of publication
Subject
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imperfect private monitoring 5 Game theory 3 Imperfect Private Monitoring 3 Repeated Game 3 repeated games 3 Centrality 2 Cooperation 2 Network 2 Strategic Communication 2 community enforcement 2 imperfect public monitoring 2 information transmission 2 networks 2 non-point source pollution 2 public choice 2 reputation 2 trust 2 Concealed Trade Barriers 1 Confidence 1 Environmental Economics and Policy 1 International Trade Agreements 1 Kooperation 1 Prisoner's Dilemma 1 Prisoner’s Dilemma 1 Repeated games 1 Reputation 1 Social network 1 Soziales Netzwerk 1 Spieltheorie 1 Trade Disputes 1 Trigger Strategies 1 Vertrauen 1 WTO 1 Wiederholte Spiele 1 agricultural extension 1 agricultural extension and public education 1 public education 1
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Online availability
All
Free 8
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 8
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 3 Arbeitspapier 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
Language
All
English 5 Undetermined 3
Author
All
Beard, Rodney 2 Kinateder, Markus 2 King, Maia 2 Mallawaarachchi, Thilak 2 Salerno, Gillian 2 Horner, Johannes 1 Olszewski, Wojciech 1 Park, Jee-Hyeong 1
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Institution
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Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society - AARES 1 Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research 1 Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 1 Society for Economic Dynamics - SED 1 Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 1
Published in...
All
2004 Meeting Papers 1 2007 Conference (51st), February 13-16, 2007, Queenstown, New Zealand 1 CEI Working Paper Series 1 MPRA Paper 1 Nota di Lavoro 1 Working Paper 1 Working Papers / Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 1 Working paper 1
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Source
All
RePEc 5 EconStor 2 ECONIS (ZBW) 1
Showing 1 - 8 of 8
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Whom can you trust? Reputation and cooperation in networks
King, Maia - 2017
Community enforcement is an important device for sustaining efficiency in some repeated games of cooperation. We investigate cooperation when information about players' reputations spreads to their future partners through links in a social network that connects them. We find that information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011928009
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Cover Image
Whom can you trust? : reputation and cooperation in networks
King, Maia - 2017
Community enforcement is an important device for sustaining efficiency in some repeated games of cooperation. We investigate cooperation when information about players' reputations spreads to their future partners through links in a social network that connects them. We find that information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011773641
Saved in:
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The repeated prisoner's dilemma in a network
Kinateder, Markus - 2010
Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner's Dilemma played on a communication network …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272435
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The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a Network
Kinateder, Markus - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a communication network …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674329
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Enforcing International Trade Agreements with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Private Trigger Strategies and the Possible Role of the WTO
Park, Jee-Hyeong - Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic … - 2009
International trade disputes often involve the WTO as a third party that generates impartial opinions on potential violations when countries receive imperfect and private signals of violations. To identify the role that the WTO plays in enforcing trade agreements, this paper first explores what...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008548294
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Environmental lobbying with imperfect public monitoring of environmental quality
Beard, Rodney; Mallawaarachchi, Thilak; Salerno, Gillian - Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society … - 2007
case of both perfect and imperfect monitoring of environmental quality and compare these with imperfect private monitoring …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005468645
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Cover Image
Environmental lobbying with imperfect monitoring of environmental quality
Beard, Rodney; Mallawaarachchi, Thilak; Salerno, Gillian - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
case of both perfect and imperfect monitoring of environmental quality and compare these with imperfect private monitoring …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835582
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The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring
Olszewski, Wojciech; Horner, Johannes - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2004
"Selection in Dynamic Games" 1. Assortative Matching with costly search, presented by Alp Atakan 2. A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium with Application to Decentralized Collusion, presented by Peter Eso 3. Noisy evolution in Normal form Games, presented by Christoph Kuzmics 4. The folk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027273
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