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  • Search: subject:"infinite-action games"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Existence 2 infinite-action games 2 public randomization 2 stochastic games 2 subgame-perfect equilibrium 2 Complete information 1 Dynamic game 1 Dynamisches Spiel 1 Equilibrium model 1 Equilibrium theory 1 Game theory 1 Gleichgewichtsmodell 1 Gleichgewichtstheorie 1 Nash equilibrium 1 Nash-Gleichgewicht 1 Nichtkooperatives Spiel 1 Noncooperative game 1 Spieltheorie 1 Stochastic game 1 Stochastisches Spiel 1 Vollkommene Information 1
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Online availability
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Free 2 CC license 1
Type of publication
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Article 2
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Article 1 Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1
Language
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English 2
Author
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Barelli, Paulo 2 Duggan, John 2
Published in...
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Theoretical Economics 1 Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory 1
Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 1 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 2 of 2
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Subgame-perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: Dispensing with public randomization
Barelli, Paulo; Duggan, John - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1221-1248
Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189006
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Cover Image
Subgame‐perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information : dispensing with public randomization
Barelli, Paulo; Duggan, John - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1221-1248
Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806463
Saved in:
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