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  • Search: subject:"informational value of test"
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Year of publication
Subject
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discrimination risk 8 informational value of test 8 personalized medicine 5 consent law 4 disclosure duty 4 experiment 4 Theorie 3 Theory 3 personalized medecine 3 Discrimination 2 Discrimination risk 2 Diskriminierung 2 Experiment 2 Informational value of test 2 Personalized medicine 2 Risiko 2 Risk 2 Adverse Selektion 1 Adverse selection 1 Asymmetric information 1 Asymmetrische Information 1 Disease 1 Genetic engineering 1 Genetics 1 Genetik 1 Gentechnik 1 Health insurance 1 Information value 1 Informationswert 1 Insurance premium 1 Krankenversicherung 1 Krankheit 1 Moral Hazard 1 Moral hazard 1 Versicherungsbeitrag 1 pooling and separating equilibria 1
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Online availability
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Free 7 Undetermined 2
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 8 Article 2
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 3 Arbeitspapier 2 Graue Literatur 2 Non-commercial literature 2 Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1
Language
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English 5 Undetermined 5
Author
All
Bardey, David 10 De Donder, Philippe 6 Donder, Philippe De 4 Mantilla, Cesar 3 Mantilla, César 1
Institution
All
UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE 2 C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1 CESifo 1 UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO 1
Published in...
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DOCUMENTOS CEDE 2 CEPR Discussion Papers 1 CESifo Working Paper 1 CESifo Working Paper Series 1 CESifo working papers 1 DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO / UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO 1 Journal of Health Economics 1 Journal of health economics 1 Working papers / TSE : WP 1
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Source
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RePEc 6 ECONIS (ZBW) 3 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 10 of 10
Cover Image
Welfare impacts of genetic testing in health insurance markets : will cross‐subsidies survive?
Bardey, David; De Donder, Philippe - 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012182158
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Adverse Selection vs Discrimination Risk with Genetic Testing. An Experimental Approach
Bardey, David; De Donder, Philippe; Mantilla, Cesar - 2014
We develop a theoretical analysis of two widely used regulations of genetic tests, disclosure duty and consent law, and we run several experiments in order to shed light on both the take-up rate of genetic testing and on the comparison of policyholders' welfare under the two regulations....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435785
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Cover Image
Adverse Selection vs Discrimination Risk with Genetic Testing. An Experimental Approach
Bardey, David; Donder, Philippe De; Mantilla, César - UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE - 2014
We develop a theoretical analysis of two widely used regulations of genetic tests, disclosure duty and consent law, and we run several experiments in order to shed light on both the take-up rate of genetic testing and on the comparison of policy-holders’ welfare under the two regulations....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011098126
Saved in:
Cover Image
Adverse Selection vs Discrimination Risk with Genetic Testing. An Experimental Approach
Bardey, David; Donder, Philippe De; Mantilla, Cesar - CESifo - 2014
We develop a theoretical analysis of two widely used regulations of genetic tests, disclosure duty and consent law, and we run several experiments in order to shed light on both the take-up rate of genetic testing and on the comparison of policyholders’ welfare under the two regulations....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011082825
Saved in:
Cover Image
Adverse selection vs discrimination risk with genetic testing : an experimental approach
Bardey, David; De Donder, Philippe; Mantilla, Cesar - 2014
We develop a theoretical analysis of two widely used regulations of genetic tests, disclosure duty and consent law, and we run several experiments in order to shed light on both the take-up rate of genetic testing and on the comparison of policyholders' welfare under the two regulations....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010433974
Saved in:
Cover Image
Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard
Bardey, David; Donder, Philippe De - UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE - 2012
We develop a model where a genetic test reveals whether an individual has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease this probability. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010763907
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Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard
Bardey, David; Donder, Philippe De - UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO - 2011
Abstract:We develop a model where a free genetic test reveals whether the individual tested has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease the probability of developing the disease. Agents are not obliged to take the test,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009358905
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Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard
Bardey, David; De Donder, Philippe - In: Journal of Health Economics 32 (2013) 5, pp. 768-779
We develop a model where a genetic test reveals whether an individual has a low or high probability of developing a disease. Testing is not mandatory, but agents have to reveal their test results to the insurers, facing a discrimination risk. A costly prevention effort allows agents with a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010870845
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Cover Image
Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard
Bardey, David; De Donder, Philippe - In: Journal of health economics 32 (2013) 5, pp. 768-779
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010210783
Saved in:
Cover Image
Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard
Bardey, David; De Donder, Philippe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
We develop a model where a genetic test reveals whether an individual has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease this probability. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083355
Saved in:
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