Search Results - subject:"interdependent valuations"

Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities

Zik, Boaz - In: Economic theory 75 (2023) 2, pp. 567-590

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014226655

Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities

Zik, Boaz - In: Economic Theory 75 (2022) 2, pp. 567-590

A seller of an item faces a potential buyer whose valuation of the item depends on two private signals. It is well known that when there are informational externalities and the buyer's private signals arrive all at once, it is impossible to implement an efficient sale. I show that if the buyer's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015325492

Selling with evidence

Koessler, Frédéric; Skreta, Basilik¯e - In: Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) 2, pp. 345-371

We study the informed-principal problem in a bilateral asymmetric information trading setting with interdependent values and quasi-linear utilities. The informed seller proposes a mechanism and voluntarily certifies information about the good's characteristics. When the set of certifiable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215310

Selling with evidence

Koessler, Frédéric; Skreta, Basilikē - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 2, pp. 345-371

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012022727

Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons

Gerardi, Dino; Maestri, Lucas - Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino - 2013

A seller dynamically sells a divisible good to a buyer. It is common knowledge that there are gains from trade and that the gains per unit are decreasing. Payoffs are interdependent as in Akerlof's market for lemons. The seller is informed about the good's quality. The buyer makes an offer in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862058

Efficiency vs Optimality in Procurement

Postl, Peter - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 2011

We study procurement procedures that simultaneously determine specification and price of a good. Suppliers can offer and produce the good in either of two possible specifications, both of which are equally good for the buyer. Production costs are interdependent and unknown at the time of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323817

Efficiency versus Optimality in Procurement

Postl, Peter - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391869

Efficiency vs Optimality in Procurement

Postl, Peter - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 2011

We study procurement procedures that simultaneously determine specification and price of the required good. Two suppliers can each produce the good in any one of two possible specifications, both of which are equally good for the buyer. Production costs are interdependent and unknown at the time...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008837901

Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction

Mezzetti, Claudio - Department of Economics, Leicester University - 2005

Claudio Mezzetti Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction Received: (date) / Accepted: (date …, Interdependent Valuations, Mechanism Design. JEL: D44 & D82. _______________________________________________ This research was … any new information from the observation of his allocation payoﬀ, with interdependent valuations observing his realized …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005569942

Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition

Mezzetti, Claudio - 2003

with interdependent valuations and multidimen-sional, but independent, signals, efficient auction design is impossible …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325062