This paper reviews game theoretic approaches to develop the formation of international environmental agreements in general and climate agreements in particular. We confront cooperative and non-cooperative approaches paying special attention to heterogeneous players and transfers. Recent...

This paper reviews game theoretic approaches to develop the formation of international environmental agreements in general and climate agreements in particular. We confront cooperative and non-cooperative approaches paying special attention to heterogeneous players and transfers. Recent...

Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more...

Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more...

Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more...