Search Results - subject:"intrinsic preferences"

Lane, Tom - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 202 (2022), pp. 119-130

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013550224

Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies

Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - 2017

We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies when agents have intrinsic … preferences for responsibility. An agent has an intrinsic preference for responsibility if she cares about truth-telling that is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011788908

Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies

Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599044

Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal

Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of … - 2015

et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the … Walrasian rule is shown tobe non-implementable where all agents have weak (but not strong) intrinsic preferences for honesty … strong intrinsic preferences for honesty. Lastly, the Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011115235

Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal

Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - 2014

et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the … Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all agents have weak (but not strong) intrinsic preferences for honesty … strong intrinsic preferences for honesty. Lastly, the Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457041

Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal

Lombardi, Michele; Naoki, Yoshihara - Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts-Amherst - 2014

et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the … Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all agents have weak (but not strong) intrinsic preferences for honesty … strong intrinsic preferences for honesty. Lastly, the Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010961416

Natural Implementation with Partially-honest Agents in Economic Environments with Free-disposal

Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University - 2014

et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the … Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all agents have weak (but not strong) intrinsic preferences for honesty … strong intrinsic preferences for honesty. Lastly, the Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010934350

Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal

Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - 2014

et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the … Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all agents have weak (but not strong) intrinsic preferences for honesty … strong intrinsic preferences for honesty. Lastly, the Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010426591

Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal

Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429339

Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments

Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

In this paper, we introduce the weak and the strong notions of partially honest agents (Dutta and Sen, 2012), and then study implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) in pure exchange economies with three or more agents in which pure-consequentialistically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108539