This paper presents a model and experimental evidence to explain the “volunteering puzzle” where agents prefer volunteering time to donating money when monetary donations are, ceteris paribus, more efficient for providing resources to charity. In the model agents receive heterogeneous...

Following the successful PCS Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum. Spectrum auctions have raised hundreds of billion dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based...

Experiments on intertemporal consumption typically show that people have difficulties in optimally solving such problems. Previous studies have focused on contexts in which agents are faced with risky future incomes and have to plan over long horizons. We present an experiment comparing decision...

We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price...

This paper extends choice theory by allowing for the interaction between cognitive costs and imitative dynamics. The authors experimentally investigate the role of imitation when participants face a task which is costly in cognitive terms. In order to disentangle different choice dynamics, they...

We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FP). We consider both traditional antitrust policy (without a leniency program) and modern antitrust policy (with a leniency program). In...

This paper studies the effects of pre-trip information on route-choice decisions when travel conditions on two alternative congestible routes vary unpredictably. It presents and discusses an experiment designed to test a model recently proposed in a companion paper by Lindsey et al. (2013). That...

We explore how models of boundedly rational decision-making in games can explain the overdissipation of rents in laboratory Tullock contest games. Using a new series of experiments in which group size is varied across sessions, we find that models based on logit choice organize the data well. In...

Experiments based on the Beard and Beil (Manag Sci 40(2):252–262, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">1994</CitationRef>) two-player coordination game robustly show that coordination failures arise as a result of two puzzling behaviors: (i) subjects are not willing to rely on others’ self-interested maximization, and (ii) self-interested...</citationref>