It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … to be "nice". More generally, it also applies to uncoupled learning heuristics leading to correlated equilibria …

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … be "nice". More generally, it also applies to uncoupled learning heuristics leading to correlated equilibria …

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … be "nice". More generally, it also applies to uncoupled learning heuristics leading to correlated equilibria …

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … be "nice". More generally, it also applies to uncoupled learning heuristics leading to correlated equilibria …