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  • Search: subject:"multi-object auction design"
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Year of publication
Subject
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equal treatment of equals 2 ex-post revenue maximization 2 minimumWalrasian equilibrium price mechanism 2 multi-object auction design 2 no wastage 2 non-quasilinear preferences 2 strategy-proof mechanism design 2 Auction theory 1 Auktionstheorie 1 Mechanism design 1 Mechanismus-Design-Theorie 1 Präferenztheorie 1 Theory of preferences 1
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Online availability
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Free 2
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 2
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 2 Arbeitspapier 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
Language
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English 2
Author
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Kazumura, Tomoya 2 Mishra, Debasis 2 Serizawa, Shigehiro 2
Published in...
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Discussion paper / Institute of Social and Economic Research 1 ISER Discussion Paper 1
Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 1 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 2 of 2
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Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage
Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2017
A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents. Each agent can buy at most one object and his utility over consumption bundles (i.e., (object,transfer) pairs) need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012013669
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Cover Image
Strategy-proof multi-object auction design : ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage
Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2017
A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents. Each agent can buy at most one object and his utility over consumption bundles (i.e., (object,transfer) pairs) need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011645220
Saved in:
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