EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • A-Z
  • Beta
  • About EconBiz
  • News
  • Thesaurus (STW)
  • Academic Skills
  • Help
  •  My account 
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • Login
EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
Publications Events
Search options
Advanced Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites Loans Reservations Fines
    You are here:
  • Home
  • Search: subject:"multitask principal-agent problem"
Narrow search

Narrow search

Year of publication
Subject
All
Make-or-buy decision 2 Multitask principal-agent problem 2 Outsourcing 2 contracting out 2 make-or-buy decision 2 multitask principal-agent problem 2 Make or Buy 1 Privatisierung 1 Theorie 1
more ... less ...
Online availability
All
Free 3
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 4
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 2
Language
All
English 3 Undetermined 1
Author
All
Andersson, Fredrik 3 Andersson, Fredrik N. G. 1
Institution
All
Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) 1 Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan 1
Published in...
All
IFN Working Paper 1 Working Paper 1 Working Paper Series / Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) 1 Working Papers / Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan 1
Source
All
EconStor 2 RePEc 2
Showing 1 - 4 of 4
Cover Image
A Trickle-Down Theory of Incentives with Applications to Privatization and Outsourcing
Andersson, Fredrik - 2009
The make-or-buy decision is analyzed in a three-layer principal-management-agent model. There is a cost-saving/quality tradeoff in effort provision. The principal chooses between employing an in-house management and contracting with an independent management; the cost-saving incentives facing...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010320245
Saved in:
Cover Image
A Trickle-Down Theory of Incentives with Applications to Privatization and Outsourcing
Andersson, Fredrik - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2009
The make-or-buy decision is analyzed in a three-layer principal-management-agent model. There is a cost-saving/quality tradeoff in effort provision. The principal chooses between employing an in-house management and contracting with an independent management; the cost-saving incentives facing...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005645337
Saved in:
Cover Image
A Trickle-Down Theory of Incentives with Applications to Privatization and Outsourcing
Andersson, Fredrik N. G. - 2004
The make-or-buy decision is analyzed in a three-layer principal-management-agent model. There is a cost-saving/quality tradeoff in effort provision. The principal faces the choice between employing an in-house management and contracting with an independent management; the cost-saving incentives...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013208457
Saved in:
Cover Image
A Trickle-Down Theory of Incentives with Applications to Privatization and Outsourcing
Andersson, Fredrik - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2004
The make-or-buy decision is analyzed in a three-layer principal-management-agent model. There is a cost-saving/quality tradeoff in effort provision. The principal faces the choice between employing an in-house management and contracting with an independent management; the cost-saving incentives...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005645109
Saved in:
A service of the
zbw
  • Sitemap
  • Plain language
  • Accessibility
  • Contact us
  • Imprint
  • Privacy

Loading...