This paper tests the hypothesis that a (partial) reason why cartels - collective but costly and non-binding price … the opportunity to form agreements; followed by a version where participants can vote whether to have a (costly) non-binding … the first game by participants who vote for and against an agreement in the second game. We do confirm that having a non-binding …

This paper tests the hypothesis that a (partial) reason why cartels - collective but costly and non-binding price … the opportunity to form agreements; followed by a version where participants can vote whether to have a (costly) non-binding … the first game by participants who vote for and against an agreement in the second game. We do confirm that having a non-binding …

, non-binding promises and social feedback help to promote sustainable behavior. We find that cooperation is higher in …, cooperation is significantly higher. Our findings show that non-binding promises and social feedback increase cooperation, but the …

, non-binding promises and social feedback help to promote sustainable behavior. We find that cooperation is higher in …, cooperation is significantly higher. Our findings show that non-binding promises and social feedback increase cooperation, but the …

results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates. But this does not extend to teams. Wh ile teams … make non-binding promises to cooperate at the same rate as individuals, they consistently renege on those promises …

results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates. But this does not extend to teams. Wh ile teams … make non-binding promises to cooperate at the same rate as individuals, they consistently renege on those promises …