Many poor countries are ill-adapted to the current leave alone a changing future climate, because they lack the necessary financial means to invest in efficient and cost-effective safeguarding measures. International endeavours to fund institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund, to provide...

Many poor countries are ill-adapted to the current leave alone a changing future climate, because they lack the necessary financial means to invest in efficient and costeffective safeguarding measures. International endeavours to fund institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund, to provide...

Many poor countries are ill-adapted to the current leave alone a changing future climate, because they lack the necessary financial means to invest in efficient and costeffective safeguarding measures. International endeavours to fund institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund, to provide...

Many poor countries are ill-adapted to the current leave alone a changing future climate, because they lack the necessary financial means to invest in efficient and cost-effective safeguarding measures. International endeavours to fund institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund, to provide...

We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...

We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...

We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...

We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...

We analyze non-cooperative international climate policy in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. In the first stage, countries decide whether to set up an international emission permits market, which only forms if it is supported by all countries. In the second stage,...