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Year of publication
Subject
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Auctions 1 Multidimensional types 1 Necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium 1 Non-monotonic bidding functions 1 Pure strategy equilibria 1 Tie-breaking rules 1 auctions 1 non-monotonic bidding functions 1 pure strategy equilibria 1 tie-breaking 1
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Online availability
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Free 1 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
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Article 1 Book / Working Paper 1
Language
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English 1 Undetermined 1
Author
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Araujo, Aloisio 2 Castro, Luciano 1 Filho, Luciano I. de Castro 1 Moreira, Humberto 1
Institution
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Econometric Society 1
Published in...
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Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 1 Economic Theory 1
Source
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RePEc 2
Showing 1 - 2 of 2
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Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions
Araujo, Aloisio; Filho, Luciano I. de Castro - Econometric Society - 2004
We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in common values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisfied, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328867
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Cover Image
Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
Araujo, Aloisio; Castro, Luciano; Moreira, Humberto - In: Economic Theory 35 (2008) 3, pp. 407-440
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005155434
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