We present a selection of seminar slides based on our 2013 Quarterly Journal of Economics paper, "https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1640552" Managerial Miscalibration. Using a large panel of CFO forecasts of S&P 500 returns, we find that executives are severely miscalibrated,...

In competitive economies with private firm ownership, incomplete markets, and firm shareholders changing over time, several firm objectives have been proposed. Some are useful to understand efficiency of equilibria, and others are explicitly consistent with majority shareholder control or...

We exploit the network of director interlocks to examine the influence of the board's stakeholder orientation on the firm's disposition towards its stakeholders, director selection, and valuation. Using measures of stakeholder orientation of the board and the firm, we find that the board's...

Using a unique 10-year panel that includes more than 13,300 expected stock market return probability distributions, we find that executives are severely miscalibrated, producing distributions that are too narrow: realized market returns are within the executives' 80% confidence intervals only...

Corporate governance rules have an enormous impact on people's lives. This is true whether the corporation is public or private, and regardless of its size, since the rules governing corporate behavior and director conduct apply regardless of the size of the corporation or the number of its...

The stockholder/stakeholder dilemma has occupied corporate leaders and corporate lawyers for over a century. In addition to the question whose interests should managers prioritize, the question how those interests could or should be balanced has proven equally difficult. To address the latter...