Ýmrohoroðlu, Ýmrohoroðlu and Joines [1995, A life-cycle analysis of Social Security, Economic Theory, vol. 6, 83-114] show that the optimal replacement ratio of the payas-you-go public pension system in the US economy amounts to 30%. We extend their analysis to a model that 1) replicates the...

Ýmrohoroðlu, Ýmrohoroðlu and Joines [1995, A life-cycle analysis of Social Security, Economic Theory, vol. 6, 83-114] show that the optimal replacement ratio of the payas-you-go public pension system in the US economy amounts to 30%. We extend their analysis to a model that 1) replicates the...

Ýmrohoroðlu, Ýmrohoroðlu and Joines [1995, A life-cycle analysis of Social Security, Economic Theory, vol. 6, 83-114] show that the optimal replacement ratio of the payas-you-go public pension system in the US economy amounts to 30%. We extend their analysis to a model that 1) replicates the...

Because of the dynamic inconsistency problem in optimal policies of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems, parametric reforms tend to be unfair in terms of generational justice and could be inefficient in terms of optimal level of consumption. As long as there are adverse shocks, the planner has to...

This paper examines the increase in generational selfishness in parametric reforms of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems as a potential outcome of the time-inconsistency problem in optimal policies. When an adverse demographic shock occurs, the planner has to decide on its generational...

This paper examines the increase in generational selfishness in parametric reforms of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems as a potential outcome of the time-inconsistency problem in optimal policies. When an adverse demographic shock occurs, the planner has to decide on its generational...

We study the optimal size of a pay-as-you-go social security program for an economy composed of both permanent-income and hand-to-mouth consumers. While previous work on this topic is framed within a two-period partial equilibrium setup, we study this issue in a life-cycle general equilibrium...

We study the optimal size of a pay-as-you-go social security program for an economy composed of both permanent-income and hand-to-mouth consumers. While previous work on this topic is framed within a two-period partial equilibrium setup, we study this issue in a life-cycle general equilibrium...