I study a central authority's ability to commit to a publicly announced mechanism in a one-to-one agent-object matching model. The authority announces a strategy-proof mechanism and then privately selects a mechanism to initiate a matching. An agent's observation in form of the final matching...

I study a central authority's ability to commit to a publicly announced mechanism in a one-to-one agent-object matching model. The authority announces a strategy-proof mechanism and then privately selects a mechanism to initiate a matching. An agent's observation in form of the final matching...

We model a society that values the coherence between past policy platforms and current implemented policy, and where policy platforms partially commit candidates to their future actions. If an incumbent politician seeks to be reelected, she has to use her platforms to commit to moderate policies...

We consider a regulator providing deposit insurance to a bank with private information about its investment portfolio. Following current regulatory practices, we assume that the regulator does not commit to audit and sanction after any risk report from the bank. We show that, in absence of...

We consider a regulator providing deposit insurance to a bank with private information about its investment portfolio. As typical in practice, we assume that the regulator does not commit to auditing after any risk report from the bank. We first show that the optimal contract can be implemented...