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Search: subject:"payoff uncertainty"
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Pareto efficiency
4
allocative efficiency
4
auction
4
downside risk
4
payoff uncertainty
4
risk aversion
4
Allokationseffizienz
2
Auktionstheorie
2
Pareto-Optimum
2
Risikoaversion
2
Allocative efficiency
1
Auction theory
1
Greenberg works in an extensive-form context
1
Kreps and Levine (1987)
1
Risiko
1
Risk
1
Risk aversion
1
Rubinstein and Wolinksy consider strategic-form games and general "signal fictions". We should make clear from the outset that
1
Theorie
1
Zahlungsverhalten
1
a key issue is what sort of prior itiormation about payoffs should be considered. It is well known that predictions based on common certainty of payoffs are not robust to even a small amount of uncertainty. Following Fudenberg
1
although this paper is motivated by the learning-theoretic approach to equilibrium in games
1
and players observe only the outcomes in their own matches
1
and that this difference corresponds to the distinction between SCE and RSCE.8 Papers by Rubinstein and Wolinksy [1994] and Greenberg [1994]
1
are based on the idea that players form their forecasts of opponents play using prior information both about the opponents' payoffs and about the realized outcomes when the game is played. Both these papers
1
as it is not in most experiments
1
both in the real world and in the laboratory
1
but it is consistent with an (approximate
1
but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. Intuitively
1
but we have not checked the details
1
by the last few rounds of the experiment the first movers had stopped contributing
1
consider common certainty of rationality
1
each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path
1
each time the game is played
1
for example
1
heterogeneous) SCE (Fudenberg and Levine [1996] 7 ). Thus these experiments provide evidence that information about other players' payoffs makes a difference
1
in addition to almost common certainty of the payoffs
1
in section 4 we show that it does correspond to assuming almost common certainty of payoffs and independence. To capture the idea of SCE
1
incorporating restrictions on the priors into the steady-state learning model of Fudenberg and Levine [1993 b]
1
independence is discussed fi.u-ther in section 6.) Combining these assumptions lead to rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium
1
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Zou, Liang
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Dekel, Eddie
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Hu, Audrey Xianhua
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Auctions under
Payoff
Uncertainty
: The Case with Heterogeneous Bidder-Aversion to Downside Risk
Hu, Audrey
;
Zou, Liang
-
2008
, contracts, or licenses that involve ensuing
payoff
uncertainty
for the winning bidder. The distribution of the random payoff is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325804
Saved in:
2
Auctions under
Payoff
Uncertainty
: The Case with Heterogeneous Bidder-Aversion to Downside Risk
Hu, Audrey
;
Zou, Liang
-
Tinbergen Instituut
-
2008
, contracts, or licenses that involve ensuing
payoff
uncertainty
for the winning bidder. The distribution of the random payoff is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256873
Saved in:
3
Auctions under
Payoff
Uncertainty
: The Case with Heterogeneous Bidder-Aversion to Downside Risk
Hu, Audrey
;
Zou, Liang
-
Tinbergen Institute
-
2008
, contracts, or licenses that involve ensuing
payoff
uncertainty
for the winning bidder. The distribution of the random payoff is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136943
Saved in:
4
Auctions under
payoff
uncertainty
: the case with heterogeneous bidder-aversion to downside risk
Hu, Audrey Xianhua
;
Zou, Liang
-
2008
, contracts, or licenses that involve ensuing
payoff
uncertainty
for the winning bidder. The distribution of the random payoff is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374400
Saved in:
5
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
Dekel, Eddie
;
Fudenberg, Drew
;
Levine, David K.
-
ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636460
Saved in:
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