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  • Search: subject:"performance voting"
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Year of publication
Subject
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performance voting 7 externalities 4 local public goods 4 turnout uncertainty 4 electoral accountability 3 Corruption 2 Fiscal federalism 2 capital taxation 2 fiscal federalism 2 time consistency 2 Externer Effekt 1 Finanzföderalismus 1 Lokales öffentliches Gut 1 Performance Voting 1 Performance voting 1 Political Agency 1 Public Finance 1 Theorie 1 Turnout Uncertainty 1 Wiederwahl 1 business cycles 1 economic growth 1 electoral accountabilit 1 entry regulation 1
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Online availability
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Free 9
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 9
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 1
Language
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English 6 Undetermined 3
Author
All
Dutta, J. 4 Aidt, T.S. 3 Aidt, Toke 3 Dutta, Jayasri 3 Aidt, T. 2 Aidt, Toke S. 1 Magris, F. 1 Magris, Francesco 1
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Institution
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Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge 5 CESifo 1 Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Évry Val d'Essonne 1 Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB), Facultat d'Economia i Empresa 1
Published in...
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Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 5 CESifo Working Paper 1 CESifo Working Paper Series 1 Documents de recherche 1 Working Papers / Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB), Facultat d'Economia i Empresa 1
Source
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RePEc 8 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 9 of 9
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Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability
Aidt, Toke; Dutta, Jayasri - 2010
We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270517
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Fiscal Federalism and Electoral Accountability
Aidt, T.; Dutta, J. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2010
We study the e¢ cient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008552431
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Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability
Aidt, Toke S.; Dutta, Jayasri - Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB), Facultat … - 2010
We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008565925
Saved in:
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Fiscal Federalism and Electoral Accountability
Aidt, Toke; Dutta, Jayasri - CESifo - 2010
We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583690
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A Theory of the Corrupt Keynesian
Aidt, T.S.; Dutta, J. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2008
We evaluate the impact of real business cycle shocks on corruption and economic policy in a model of entry regulation in a representative democracy. We .nd that corruption is procyclical and regulation policy is counter-cyclical. Corrupt politicians engage in excessive stabilization of aggregate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783743
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Electoral Uncertainty and Public Goods
Aidt, T.S.; Dutta, J. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2008
This paper argues that uncertain or random voter turnout plays a key role in mediating conflicts of interest between voters and politicians on the one hand and heterogenous groups of voters on the other. Random voter turnout creates an incentive for politicians to seek con- sensus because it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207831
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Policy Compromises: Corruption and Regulation in a Dynamic Democracy
Aidt, T.S.; Dutta, J. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2004
This paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with political corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalisation implies free entry and allocative efficiency and is supported by a majority of voters. Voters...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489315
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Capital Taxation and Electoral Accountability
Aidt, Toke; Magris, Francesco - Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), … - 2004
This paper investigates the role of performance voting in solving the capital levy problem. In a representative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939369
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Capital Taxation and Electoral Accountability
Aidt, T.; Magris, F. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2003
for the tax policies they implement while in office. This paper demonstrates that performance voting can - partly or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489300
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