Under the bounded rationality assumption, a principal rarely provides an optimal contract to an agent. Learning from others is one way to improve such a contract. This paper studies the efficiency of social network learning (SNL) in the principal-agent framework. We first introduce the...

I study a persuasion game between a privately informed agent and a decision maker (DM) who can imperfectly verify the statements made by the agent by observing a signal that is correlated with the agent's information. I find that whether or not the DM benefits from communicating with the agent...

We study a repeated principal-agent model with transferable utility, where the principal's evaluation of the agent's performance is subjective. Our focus is on equilibria which are robust to the addition of small privately observed shocks to the payoffs. Existing constructions of positive-effort...

This study analyzes the impact of directors belonging to several boards (multiple directorships) on the dividend policy of firms. As the composition of a board has an impact on its effectiveness and the quality of corporate governance, this study focuses on the presence of multiple...

A principal provides incentives for independent agents. The principal cannot observe the agents' actions, nor does she know the entire set of actions available to them. It is shown that an anti-informativeness principle holds: very generally, robustly optimal contracts must link the incentive...