Search Results - subject:"principal–agent problem"

Incentive, status and thereafter: A critical survey

Dey, Oindrila; Banerjee, Swapnendu - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

This paper aims to provide a survey on the studies on incentive, especially non-monetary incentive like status. We intend to summarize the different studies in a concise manner and comment on the divergent views on valuation for status, relation between monetary and status incentives, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112823

Physician Incentive Management in University Hospitals: Inducing Efficient Behavior Through the Allocation of Research Facilities

Glorie, Glorie, K.M.; van Oostrum, van Oostrum, J.M.; … - Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen, Erasmus … - 2010

The imperative to improve healthcare efficiency is now stronger than ever. Rapidly increasing healthcare demand and the prospect of healthcare cost exploding require that measures be taken to make healthcare organizations become more efficiency-aware. Alignment of organizational interests is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011149296

Physician Incentive Management in University Hospitals: Including Efficient Behavior Through the Allocation of Research Facilities

Glorie, K.; Oostrum, J.M. van; Dur, R.A.J.; Kazemier, G.; … - Erasmus University Rotterdam, Econometric Institute - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008677979

Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents

Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin G.; Popova, Vera - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

One-shot interaction and repeated interaction often co-exist in the real world. We study possible behavioral effects of this co-existence in a principal-agent setting, in which a principal simultaneously employs a permanent and a temporary agent. Our experimental results indicate that there is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008494223

Tractability in Incentive Contracting

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509464

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier; Sadzik, Tomasz; Sannikov, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008477185

Faculty: Thy administrator's keeper? Some evidence

Cunningham, Brendan M. - In: Economics of Education Review 28 (2009) 4, pp. 444-453

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008493352

Outsourcing of innovation

Lai, Edwin; Riezman, Raymond; Wang, Ping - In: Economic Theory 38 (2009) 3, pp. 485-515

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005155318

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

Cabrales, Antonio; Charness, Gary - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2000

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772130

National Hockey League guaranteed contracts : A principal agent problem impacting on performance

Landry, Jon; Edgar, David; Harris, John; Grant, Kevin - In: Management Research Review 38 (2015) 12, pp. 1306-1330

Purpose – This paper aims to investigate, through the lens of the principal–agent problem, the relationship between … comprehensive and current perspective of the principal–agent problem in NHL and extends the work of Purcell (2009) and Gannon (2009 … – This paper quantifies potential inefficiencies of NHL league contracts and defines the parameters of the principal–agent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014952606