In the present article, Tiebout meets Laffont and Tirole in the land of Fiscal Federalism. We use a non-trivial Principal-Multi-Agent model to characterize the optimal intergovernmental grant schedule, when the cost of local public goods depends on hidden characteristics and actions of local...

We investigate waste management and disposal performances through the lens of the multi-tasking model (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) to analyse the conversion that occurred in the Italian municipal waste management system, which is of interest due to its idiosyncratic and extensive...

We investigate waste management and disposal performances through the lens of the multi-tasking model (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) to analyse the conversion that occurred in the Italian municipal waste management system, which is of interest due to its idiosyncratic and extensive...

The originality of the REDD proposal is its incentives-based mechanism designed to reward the governments of developing countries for their performance in reducing deforestation as measured against a baseline. This mechanism is founded on the hypothesis that developing countries ‘pay’ an...

We study the effect of leadership on incentive contracts in a moral-hazard framework. In our model, agents are allowed to choose the timing of their actions. The agents may choose their effort levels simultaneously or sequentially. We show that relative performance evaluation leads to a subgame...